David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Social Epistemology 16 (4):367 – 376 (2002)
The article is an attempt to better understand the objections to the doctrine of 'reliabilism' made by prominent epistemologists. The view argued for here is that while one extreme case of anti-reliabilism seems to be the paradigm case against the entire concept, this very case points out some additional, and implicit, problems with the standard account of epistemic justification. The most notable is that the standard view attacks reliabilism on the grounds that it lacks a means of giving adequate reasons or evidence for its claims. We argue that the standard view, while correct on its paradigm case against reliabilism, is itself weakened by its lack of recognition of the central role theories of evidence must play in its basic account. Since theories of evidence are themselves divergent and problematic in terms of explaining how claims are justified, the standard account needs to address the issues of which account of evidence is 'adequate' and why it is. It is finally suggested that traditional epistemology might be more accurately described as a branch of confirmation theory.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
Paul K. Moser (1989). Knowledge and Evidence. Cambridge University Press.
Patrick Maher (1996). Subjective and Objective Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2006). Transglobal Reliabilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):171-195.
Ernest Sosa (1992). Generic Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Issues 2:79-92.
James R. Beebe (2006). Reliabilism and Deflationism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):495 – 510.
Peter Baumann (2009). Reliabilism—Modal, Probabilistic or Contextualist. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):77-89.
Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2007). Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism. Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.
Michael Levin (1997). You Can Always Count on Reliabilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):607 - 617.
Michael Levin (1997). You Can Always Count on Reliabilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):607-617.
James Beebe (2007). Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth. Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #194,523 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #369,877 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?