David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Ethics 7 (4):365-392 (2003)
Several philosophers have recently claimed to have discovered a new and rather significant problem with virtue ethics. According to them, virtue ethics generates certain expectations about the behavior of human beings which are subject to empirical testing. But when the relevant experimental work is done in social psychology, the results fall remarkably short of meeting those expectations. So, these philosophers think, despite its recent success, virtue ethics has far less to offer to contemporary ethical theory than might have been initially thought. I argue that there are plausible ways in which virtue ethicists can resist arguments based on empirical work in social psychology. In the first three sections of the paper, I reconstruct the line of reasoning being used against virtue ethics by looking at the recent work of Gilbert Harman and John Doris. The remainder of the paper is then devoted both to responding to their challenge as well as to briefly sketching a positive account of character trait possession.
|Keywords||character traits Gilbert Harman John Doris situationism social psychology virtue ethics|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jason D'Cruz (2015). Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Moral Consequence of Consistency. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):467-484.
Peter B. M. Vranas (2005). The Indeterminacy Paradox: Character Evaluations and Human Psychology. Noûs 39 (1):1–42.
Lauren Olin & John M. Doris (2014). Vicious Minds. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):665-692.
Miguel Alzola (2008). Character and Environment: The Status of Virtues in Organizations. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 78 (3):343 - 357.
Dana K. Nelkin (2005). Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):181–206.
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