Acta Analytica 23 (1):69-89 (2008)
|Abstract||There is a fundamental ontological difference between two kinds of entity: things and objects. Unlike things, objects are not identical to any fusion of particulars. Unlike things, objects do not have mereological parts. While things are ontologically innocent, objects are not. Objects are meaty. I defend the distinction between things and objects, and provide an account of the nature of objects.|
|Keywords||Objects Things Mereology Ontology Composition|
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