David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Let me start with a disclaimer. I am not going to be primarily concerned with the Gödelian argument against mechanism, although that is what I am primarily associated with in the public mind. Not that I don't stand by it. Although there have been many criticisms, some of them ill informed and evidently based on not having read what I had actually written, the critics had a strong tendency to disagree with one another more than they did with me, or later with Roger Penrose. At first I tried to answer critical arguments, but became somewhat bored with having to make the same points over and over again. I often wondered what Gödel himself thought, having a strong sense of his being in sympathy with my general line of argument. In fact he had expressed his views in a lecture on Boxing Day, 1951, which was finally published in the third volume of his Collected Works in 1995. Gödel argues for a disjunction: an Either/Or, with the strong suggestion that the second disjunct is untenable, and hence by Modus Tollendo Ponens that the first disjunct must be true.
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