Travelling in time: How to wholly exist in two places at the same time

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):309-334 (2006)
It is possible to wholly exist at multiple spatial locations at the same time. At least, if time travel is possible and objects endure, then such must be the case. To accommodate this possibility requires the introduction of a spatial analog of either relativising properties to times—relativising properties to spatial locations—or of relativising the manner of instantiation to times—relativising the manner of instantiation to spatial locations. It has been suggested, however, that introducing irreducibly spatially relativised or spatially adverbialised properties presents some difficulties for the endurantist. I will consider an objection according to which embracing such spatially relativised properties could lead us to reject mereology altogether in favour of a metaphysics according to which objects are wholly present at every space-time point at which they exist. I argue that although such a view is coherent, there are some good reasons to reject it. Moreover, I argue that the endurantist can introduce spatially relativised or adverbialised properties without conceding that objects lack spatial parts. Such a strategy has the additional advantage that it allows the endurantist not only to explain time travel, but also to reconcile our competing intuitions about cases of fission.
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DOI 10.1353/cjp.2006.0019
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PhilPapers Archive Kristie Miller, Travelling in time: How to wholly exist in two places at the same time
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Heather Demarest (2015). Fission May Kill You. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):n/a-n/a.

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