The policy-based approach to identification

Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):105 – 125 (2007)
Abstract
In a number of recent papers, Michael Bratman has defended a policy-based theory of identification which represents the most sophisticated and compelling development of a broadly hierarchical approach to the problems about identification which Harry Frankfurt drew our attention to over thirty years ago. Here I first summarize the bare essentials of Bratman's view, and then raise doubts about both its necessity and sufficiency. Finally I consider his objections to rival value-based models, and find those objections to be less compelling than he makes them out to be.
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Michael E. Bratman (2003). A Desire of One's Own. Journal of Philosophy 100 (5):221-42.
Michael E. Bratman (2001). Two Problems About Human Agency. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309–326.
Jonathan Dancy (1995). Arguments From Illusion. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):421-438.

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