David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Social Epistemology 26 (1):3-30 (2012)
According to Popper's rationality principle, agents act in the most adequate way according to the objective situation. I propose a new interpretation of the rationality principle as consisting of an idealization and two abstractions. Based on this new interpretation, I critically discuss the privileged status that Popper ascribes to it as an integral part of all social scientific models. I argue that as an idealization, the rationality principle may play an important role in the social sciences, but it also has inherent limitations that inhibit it from having the privileged status that Popper ascribes to it in all cases.
|Keywords||abstractions explanation idealization model Popper rationality social sciences|
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References found in this work BETA
Nancy Cartwright (1989). Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford University Press.
Kenneth F. Schaffner (1993). Discovery and Explanation in Biology and Medicine. University of Chicago Press.
Davis Baird (2004). Thing Knowledge: A Philosophy of Scientific Instruments. University of California Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Boaz Miller (2013). When is Consensus Knowledge Based? Distinguishing Shared Knowledge From Mere Agreement. Synthese 190 (7):1293-1316.
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