The Rationality Principle Idealized

Social Epistemology 26 (1):3-30 (2012)
Abstract
According to Popper's rationality principle, agents act in the most adequate way according to the objective situation. I propose a new interpretation of the rationality principle as consisting of an idealization and two abstractions. Based on this new interpretation, I critically discuss the privileged status that Popper ascribes to it as an integral part of all social scientific models. I argue that as an idealization, the rationality principle may play an important role in the social sciences, but it also has inherent limitations that inhibit it from having the privileged status that Popper ascribes to it in all cases
Keywords abstractions  explanation  idealization  model  Popper  rationality  social sciences‎
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Boaz Miller, The Rationality Principle Idealized
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 13 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Mark A. Notturno (1998). Truth, Rationality, and the Situation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (3):400-421.
Maurice Lagueux (1993). Popper and the Rationality Principle. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23 (4):468-480.
Robert Nadeau (1993). Confuting Popper on the Rationality Principle. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23 (4):446-467.
Allen Oakley (2002). Popper’s Ontology of Situated Human Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (4):455-486.
James H. Moor (1976). Rationality and the Social Sciences. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976:3 - 11.
I. C. Jarvie (1998). Situational Logic and its Reception. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (3):365-380.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-02-01

Total downloads

68 ( #20,699 of 1,099,017 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #27,186 of 1,099,017 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.