Studia Logica 79 (3):373 - 407 (2005)
|Abstract||In dynamic epistemic logic and other fields, it is natural to consider relativization as an operator taking sentences to sentences. When using the ideas and methods of dynamic logic, one would like to iterate operators. This leads to iterated relativization. We are also concerned with the transitive closure operation, due to its connection to common knowledge. We show that for three fragments of the logic of iterated relativization and transitive closure, the satisfiability problems are fi1 11–complete. Two of these fragments do not include transitive closure. We also show that the question of whether a sentence in these fragments has a finite (tree) model is fi0 01–complete. These results go via reduction to problems concerning domino systems.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Sven Ove Hansson (2010). Multiple and Iterated Contraction Reduced to Single-Step Single-Sentence Contraction. Synthese 173 (2):153 - 177.
John Cantwell (1999). Some Logics of Iterated Belief Change. Studia Logica 63 (1):49-84.
Nina Gierasimczuk (2009). Bridging Learning Theory and Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Synthese 169 (2):371-384.
Wesley C. Salmon (1977). Indeterminism and Epistemic Relativization. Philosophy of Science 44 (2):199-202.
Dominic Gregory (2011). Iterated Modalities, Meaning and A Priori Knowledge. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (3).
Luca Alberucci & Vincenzo Salipante (2004). On Modal Μ-Calculus and Non-Well-Founded Set Theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):343-360.
Laura Giordano, Valentina Gliozzi & Nicola Olivetti (2002). Iterated Belief Revision and Conditional Logic. Studia Logica 70 (1):23-47.
Denis Bonnay & Paul Égré (2009). Inexact Knowledge with Introspection. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):179 - 227.
Reina Hayaki (2003). Actualism and Higher-Order Worlds. Philosophical Studies 115 (2):149 - 178.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads1 ( #290,877 of 722,700 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?