David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2004)
Alan Millar examines our understanding of why people think and act as they do. His key theme is that normative considerations form an indispensable part of the explanatory framework in terms of which we seek to understand each other. Millar defends a conception according to which normativity is linked to reasons. On this basis he examines the structure of certain normative commitments incurred by having propositional attitudes. Controversially, he argues that ascriptions of beliefs and intentions in and of themselves attribute normative commitments and that this has implications for the psychology of believing and intending. Indeed, all propositional attitudes of the sort we ascribe to people have a normative dimension, since possessing the concepts that the attitudes implicate is of its very nature commitment-incurring. The ramifications of these views for our understanding of people is explored. Millar offers illuminating discussions of reasons for belief and reasons for action; the explanation of beliefs and actions in terms of the subject's reasons; the idea that simulation has a key role in understanding people; and the limits of explanation in terms of propositional attitudes. He compares and contrasts the commitments incurred by propositional attitudes with those incurred by participating in practices, arguing that the former should not be assimilated to the latter. Understanding People will be of great interest to most philosophers of mind, as well as to those working on practical and theoretical reasoning
|Keywords||Action Belief Explanation Metaphysics Normativity Rationalization Reasoning|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$4.25 used (92% off) $9.28 new (82% off) $48.95 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BD450.M497 2004|
|ISBN(s)||0199556725 0199254400 9780199254408|
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Citations of this work BETA
Pascal Engel (2013). Doxastic Correctness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
Daniel Whiting (2010). Should I Believe the Truth? Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.
Johannes Roessler (2013). The Silence of Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):1-17.
Anandi Hattiangadi (2006). Is Meaning Normative? Mind and Language 21 (2):220-240.
Daniel Whiting (2009). Is Meaning Fraught with Ought? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (4):535-555.
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