Vagueness, persistence and indeterminate identity

Erkenntnis 64 (2):223 - 230 (2006)
I argue that for those who follow Evans in finding indeterminacy of de re identity statements problematic, ontic vagueness within a three-dimensionalist metaphysics will raise some problems that are not faced by the four-dimensionalist. For the types of strategies used to avoid de re indeterminacy within the context of ontic vagueness at-at-time, that is, spatial vagueness, are problematic within a three-dimensionalist framework when put to use within the context of ontic vagueness across-time, that is temporal vagueness.
Keywords persistence   identity   de re identity   endurance   vagueness   indeterminate identity  440107 Metaphysics
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DOI 10.2307/20013391
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Michael Tye (2000). Vagueness and Reality. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):195--210.

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