What has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?

In D. Walsh (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 105-125 (2001)
"According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys." (Jerry Fodor, The Elm and the Expert, p.32)
Keywords Evolution  Information  Intentionality  Metaphysics  Natural  Representation  Semantics  Teleology  Dretske, F
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DOI 10.1017/S135824610000713X
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