In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press (2001)
|Abstract||"According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys." (Jerry Fodor, The Elm and the Expert, p.32)|
|Keywords||Evolution Information Intentionality Metaphysics Natural Representation Semantics Teleology Dretske, F|
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