David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):176-199 (2007)
There is a traditional conception of sensory experience on which the experiences one has looking at, say, a cat could be had by someone merely hallucinating a cat. Disjunctivists take issue with this conception on the grounds that it does not enable us to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible. In particular, they think, it does not explain how it can be that experiences gained in perception enable us to be in ‘cognitive contact’ with objects and facts. I develop this chal- lenge to the traditional conception and then show that it is possible to accommo- date an adequate account of cognitive contact in keeping with the traditional conception. One upshot of the discussion is that experiences do not bear the explanatory burden placed upon them by disjunctivists
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Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Kennedy (2009). Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.
Adrian Haddock (2011). The Disjunctive Conception of Perceiving. Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):23-42.
Duncan Pritchard (2011). Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):434-455.
Matthew Kennedy (2011). Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
Alan Millar (2014). Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):1-19.
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