Buridan's Ass and Reducible Intentions

Unlike Buridan’s ass, most of us have the capacity to deal with situations in which there is more than one maximally preferable option. According to supporters of a prominent conception of intention, making a decision in this type of case involves coming to prefer, or judge preferable, one of the relevant options over the other. The purpose of this paper is to argue that accounts that reduce intentions to preferences or preferability judgments cannot explain how it is possible to rationally form and to reason from such intentions in Buridan cases. Such accounts commit us to rejecting long-standing philosophical commitments to the relation between: judgment and evidence; reconsideration and new information; preference and judgments of preferability; and (in some versions) commit us to attributing overly complex forms of motivation
Keywords Intentions  Preferences  Buridan's Ass
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/jpr_2001_28
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,707
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). Religious Pluralism and the Buridan's Ass Paradox. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (1):1-26.
Guillermo Barron (2000). Buridan's Ass and Other Dilemmas. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 7 (2/3):21-31.
Roger A. Shiner (1973). The Non-Rationality of Buridan's Ass. Southern Journal of Philosophy 11 (4):329-335.
Gyula Klima (2009). John Buridan. Oxford University Press.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

21 ( #137,372 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #118,705 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.