Synthese 148 (3):701 - 717 (2006)
|Abstract||We put together several observations on constructive negation. First, Russell anticipated intuitionistic logic by clearly distinguishing propositional principles implying the law of the excluded middle from remaining valid principles. He stated what was later called Peirce’s law. This is important in connection with the method used later by Heyting for developing his axiomatization of intuitionistic logic. Second, a work by Dragalin and his students provides easy embeddings of classical arithmetic and analysis into intuitionistic negationless systems. In the last section, we present in some detail a stepwise construction of negation which essentially concluded the formation of the logical base of the Russian constructivist school. Markov’s own proof of Markov’s principle (different from later proofs by Friedman and Dragalin) is described.|
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