David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (2):163-180 (2008)
In this contribution we will explore some of the implications of the vision of Ambient Intelligence (AmI) for law and legal philosophy. AmI creates an environment that monitors and anticipates human behaviour with the aim of customised adaptation of the environment to a personâs inferred preferences. Such an environment depends on distributed human and non-human intelligence that raises a host of unsettling questions around causality, subjectivity, agency and (criminal) liability. After discussing the vision of AmI we will present relevant research in the field of philosophy of technology, inspired by the post-phenomenological position taken by Don Ihde and the constructivist realism of Bruno Latour. We will posit the need to conceptualise technological normativity in comparison with legal normativity, claiming that this is necessary to develop democratic accountability for the implications of emerging technologies like AmI. Lastly we will investigate to what extent technological devices and infrastructures can and should be used to achieve compliance with the criminal law, and we will discuss some of the implications of non-human distributed intelligence for criminal liability
|Keywords||Criminal liability Agency Distributed intelligence Ambient intelligence Democracy Rule of law Causality|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson & Eleanor Rosch (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press.
John R. Searle (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press.
H. L. A. Hart (1994). The Concept of Law. Oxford University Press.
Bruno Latour (1999). Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies. Harvard University Press.
Peter-Paul Verbeek (2005). What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and Design. Penn State University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Luciano Floridi (2013). Distributed Morality in an Information Society. Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (3):727-743.
Robert Rosenberger (2014). Multistability and the Agency of Mundane Artifacts: From Speed Bumps to Subway Benches. Human Studies 37 (3):369-392.
Similar books and articles
Philip Brey (2005). Freedom and Privacy in Ambient Intelligence. Ethics and Information Technology 7 (3):157-166.
Antony Duff (2007). Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law. Hart Pub..
Douglas N. Husak (2010). The Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press.
Antony Duff (2009). Legal and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (6):978-986.
Bibi van Den Berg (2010). I-Object. Techne 14 (3):207-225.
Mireille Hildebrandt (2010). The Indeterminacy of an Emergency: Challenges to Criminal Jurisdiction in Constitutional Democracy. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (2):161-181.
Peter-Paul Verbeek (2009). Ambient Intelligence and Persuasive Technology: The Blurring Boundaries Between Human and Technology. [REVIEW] NanoEthics 3 (3):231-242.
Michael S. Moore (1993). Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and its Implications for Criminal Law. Oxford University Press.
Eleni Kosta, Olli Pitkänen, Marketta Niemelä & Eija Kaasinen (2010). Mobile-Centric Ambient Intelligence in Health- and Homecare—Anticipating Ethical and Legal Challenges. Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (2):303-323.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads7 ( #304,000 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #369,877 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?