Graduate studies at Western
International Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):79-97 (2012)
|Abstract||In this article I provide a philosophical exposition of Aristotle’s claim that natural beings—precisely as beings—are intrinsically good and beautiful. The discussionattends to both living and non-living beings, and also explores the relation between Aristotle’s account of natural beauty, his teleology, and his ethics. I conclude by exploring three objections to Aristotle’s view: that many existing things are clearly bad; that the concepts “good” and “bad” apply only in relation to living things, being relevant to these not as beings but as alive; and finally, that things cannot be called good or bad in themselves, but only good or bad “for” an appropriate sort of agent. The discussion of these objections gives particular attention to the legacy of Hume’s fact-value distinction|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
A. F. Mackay (2005). Aristotle's Dilemma. Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):533 - 549.
Diana Lobel (2011). Being and the Good: Maimonides on Ontological Beauty. Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 19 (1):1-45.
Micah Lott (2012). Have Elephant Seals Refuted Aristotle? Nature, Function, and Moral Goodness. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (3):353-375.
Richard Kraut (2007). Nature in Aristotle's Ethics and Politics. Social Philosophy and Policy 24 (2):199-219.
Klaus M. Meyer-Abich (1979). Toward a Practical Philosophy of Nature. Environmental Ethics 1 (4):293-308.
David Keyt (2007). The Good Man and the Upright Citizen in Aristotle's Ethics and Politics. Social Philosophy and Policy 24 (2):220-240.
Christopher P. Long (2010). Aristotle on the Nature of Truth. Cambridge University Press.
Adriel Trott (2012). The Human Animal. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (2):269-285.
Jenny Teichman (2003). Good for and Good About. Philosophy 78 (1):115-121.
Joseph Millum (2006). Natural Goodness and Natural Evil. Ratio 19 (2):199–213.
Imtiaz Moosa (2002). Does the Failure of Utilitarianism Justify a Belief in Intrinsic Value? Philo 5 (2):123-142.
Raphael Bexten, Is Beauty a Pure Perfection? Sammelpunkt. Elektronisch Archivierte Theorie.
Added to index2012-09-18
Total downloads6 ( #154,793 of 739,306 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,476 of 739,306 )
How can I increase my downloads?