David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Minds and Machines 19 (4):517-528 (2009)
The standard view of classical cognitive science stated that cognition consists in the manipulation of language-like structures according to formal rules. Since cognition is ‘linguistic’ in itself, according to this view language is just a complex communication system and does not influence cognitive processes in any substantial way. This view has been criticized from several perspectives and a new framework (Embodied Cognition) has emerged that considers cognitive processes as non-symbolic and heavily dependent on the dynamical interactions between the cognitive system and its environment. But notwithstanding the successes of the embodied cognitive science in explaining low-level cognitive behaviors, it is still not clear whether and how it can scale up for explaining high-level cognition. In this paper we argue that this can be done by considering the role of language as a cognitive tool: i.e. how language transforms basic cognitive functions in the high-level functions that are characteristic of human cognition. In order to do that, we review some computational models that substantiate this view with respect to categorization and memory. Since these models are based on a very rudimentary form of non-syntactic ‘language’ we argue that the use of language as a cognitive tool might have been an early discovery in hominid evolution, and might have played a substantial role in the evolution of language itself.
|Keywords||Cognitive tool Computational model Embodied cognition High-level cognition Language Language evolution|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.
John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Paul M. Churchland (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.
Citations of this work BETA
Marco Mirolli (2012). Representations in Dynamical Embodied Agents: Re-Analyzing a Minimally Cognitive Model Agent. Cognitive Science 36 (5):870-895.
Similar books and articles
Evangelia G. Chrysikou, Jared M. Novick, John C. Trueswell & Sharon L. Thompson-Schill (2011). The Other Side of Cognitive Control: Can a Lack of Cognitive Control Benefit Language and Cognition? Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):253-256.
Pauli Brattico (2010). Recursion Hypothesis Considered as a Research Program for Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 20 (2):213-241.
Elissa L. Newport (2010). Plus or Minus 30 Years in the Language Sciences. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):367-373.
Emmanuel Gilissen (2005). Imitation Systems, Monkey Vocalization, and the Human Language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):133-134.
Beth Preston (1998). Cognition and Tool Use. Mind and Language 13 (4):513–547.
Keith Frankish (2010). Evolving the Linguistic Mind. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 9:206-214.
Agustín Vicente & Fernando MartínezManrique (2005). Semantic Underdetermination and the Cognitive Uses of Language. Mind and Language 20 (5):537–558.
Raymond W. Gibbs (2006). Embodiment and Cognitive Science. New York ;Cambridge University Press.
Angelo Cangelosi, Alberto Greco & Stevan Harnad (2002). Symbol Grounding and the Symbolic Theft Hypothesis. In A. Cangelosi & D. Parisi (eds.), Simulating the Evolution of Language. Springer-Verlag 191--210.
Added to index2009-12-09
Total downloads51 ( #71,474 of 1,777,936 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #95,691 of 1,777,936 )
How can I increase my downloads?