Deep and superficial apriori

Abstract
The paper challenges the entrenched equation of conceptual with apriori. It develops the idea of at least dual justification of a single piece of belief, at a deep, ultimate level and at the surface, immediately accessible to the thinker. Apriori justification then also admits of different degrees of depth. A proposition is deeply apriori for a cognizer if its ultimate ground is apriori, otherwise it is only superficially apriori . In the case of empirically applicable concepts, some of their concept-analyzing propositions are justified apriori only at the surface. Deeply, they are aposteriori, being originally straightforward empirical propositions. It is argued that there is no reason to suppose that they change their epistemic status once build into a concept.
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