David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):5--41 (2003)
The paper defends causal explanationism concerning our modal intuitions and judgments, and, in particular, the following claims. If a causally explainable mirroring or "pre-established harmony" between our mind and modal reality obtains, we are justified in believing it does. We do not hold our modal beliefs compulsively and blindly but with full subjective and objective justification. Therefore, causal explanation of our modal beliefs does not undermine rational trust in them. Explanation and trust support each other. In contrast, antiexplanationists (from Kant, through neo-Wittgensteinians to T. Nagel and J. Pust), claim that causal explanation of intuitions and judgments undermines rational trust in them.
|Keywords||Belief, Epistemology, Explanation, Intuition, Modality|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Anand Jayprakash Vaidya (2010). Understanding and Essence. Philosophia 38 (4):811-833.
Paul Tidman (1994). Logic and Modal Intuitions. The Monist 77 (3):389-398.
Steven D. Hales (2012). The Faculty of Intuition. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.
Nenad Miščević (2004). The Explainability of Intuitions. Dialectica 58 (1):43–70.
Stephen Biggs (2011). Abduction and Modality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):283-326.
Thomas Kroedel (2012). Counterfactuals and the Epistemology of Modality. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (12).
Thomas Grundmann (2007). The Nature of Rational Intuitions and a Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):69-87.
George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 71--125.
Nenad Miščević (2003). Explaining Modal Intuition. Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):5-41.
Added to index2009-06-22
Total downloads7 ( #198,842 of 1,168,037 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #37,974 of 1,168,037 )
How can I increase my downloads?