Is color-dispositionalism nasty and unecological?

Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):203 - 231 (2007)
Abstract
This article is a brief presentation and defense of response-dispositionalist intentionalism against a family of objections. The view claims that for a surface to have an objective stable color is to have a disposition to cause in normal observers a response, namely, intentional phenomenal-color experience. The objections, raised recently by M. Johnston, B. Stroud, and by Byrne and Hilbert, claim that any dispositionalist view is unfair to the naive perceiver-thinker, saddles her with massive error and represents her as maladaptated to her environment. The paper reconstructs the main line of thought in favor of response-intentionalism and argues that it is in fact rather charitable and fair to naïve cognizers, and also avoids a cluster of related objections
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References found in this work BETA
Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
John Campbell (2006). Manipulating Colour: Pounding an Almond. In T. S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oup. 31--48.
C. L. Hardin (1992). The Virtues of Illusion. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):371--382.

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