Le sphinx de la connaissance : Husserl et l'énigme de l'a priori corrélationnel

Revue de Métaphysique Et de Morale 99 (3):345 - 363 (1994)
Abstract
This study explains the principal figures of Husserl's correlational a priori (Korrelationsgedanke) in a perspective introduced in his courses on the theory of meaning in 1908. Due to the concept of Triftigkeit, which replaced that of adequacy, the criticism of naif philosophical objectism found an original form of expression. L'étude expose les figures principales de l'a priori corrélationnel (Korrelationsgedanke) chez Husserl dans une perspective ouverte par ses cours sur la théorie de la signification de 1908. Grâce au concept de la Triftigkeit qui finit ici par remplacer celui de l'adéquation, la critique de l'objectivisme philosophique naïf trouve une expression originale.
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