Peirce, Levi, and the aims of inquiry

Philosophy of Science 54 (2):256-265 (1987)
Isaac Levi uses C. S. Peirce's fallibilism as a foil for his own "epistemological infallibilism". I argue that Levi's criticisms of Peirce do not hit their target, and that the two pragmatists agree on the fundamental issues concerning background knowledge, certainty, revision of belief, and the aims of inquiry
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DOI 10.1086/289374
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