Self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds, and kinesthetic-visual matching

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-133 (1996)
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Abstract

The “intentional schema” seems identical to or dependent upon kinesthetic–visual matching, both of which account for similar empirical findings. The intentional schema, however, fails to account for variability in children's understanding of false belief and differences in children's understanding of self and other in pretense.

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