David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):183-198 (2009)
The past 50 years have seen an accumulation of evidence suggesting that associative learning depends on high-level cognitive processes that give rise to propositional knowledge. Yet, many learning theorists maintain a belief in a learning mechanism in which links between mental representations are formed automatically. We characterize and highlight the differences between the propositional and link approaches, and review the relevant empirical evidence. We conclude that learning is the consequence of propositional reasoning processes that cooperate with the unconscious processes involved in memory retrieval and perception. We argue that this new conceptual framework allows many of the important recent advances in associative learning research to be retained, but recast in a model that provides a firmer foundation for both immediate application and future research
|Keywords||association associative link automatic awareness conditioning controlled dual-system human associative learning propositional|
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Citations of this work BETA
Eric Mandelbaum (2015). Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias. Noûs 49 (3).
Carey K. Morewedge & Daniel Kahneman (2010). Associative Processes in Intuitive Judgment. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10):435-440.
Bertram Gawronski & Derek G. V. Mitchell (2014). Simultaneous Conditioning of Valence and Arousal. Cognition and Emotion 28 (4):577-595.
Ruud Custers & Henk Aarts (2011). Learning of Predictive Relations Between Events Depends on Attention, Not on Awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):368-378.
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