The propositional nature of human associative learning

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):183-198 (2009)
The past 50 years have seen an accumulation of evidence suggesting that associative learning depends on high-level cognitive processes that give rise to propositional knowledge. Yet, many learning theorists maintain a belief in a learning mechanism in which links between mental representations are formed automatically. We characterize and highlight the differences between the propositional and link approaches, and review the relevant empirical evidence. We conclude that learning is the consequence of propositional reasoning processes that cooperate with the unconscious processes involved in memory retrieval and perception. We argue that this new conceptual framework allows many of the important recent advances in associative learning research to be retained, but recast in a model that provides a firmer foundation for both immediate application and future research
Keywords association   associative link   automatic   awareness   conditioning   controlled   dual-system   human associative learning   propositional
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X09000855
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References found in this work BETA
I. P. Pavlov (1962). Conditioned Reflexes. Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (4):560-560.
Jonathan St B. T. Evans, David E. Over & Peter Carruthers (1998). Rationality and Reasoning. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):189-194.

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