Does 'Ought' Imply 'Can' from an Epistemic Point of View?

Philosophia 40 (4):829-840 (2012)
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the “Ought Implies Can” (OIC) principle, as it is employed in epistemology, particularly in the literature on epistemic norms, is open to counterexamples. I present a counterexample to OIC and discuss several objections to it. If this counterexample works, then it shows that it is possible that S ought to believe that p, even though S cannot believe that p. If this is correct, then OIC, considered from an epistemic point of view, is false, since it is supposed to hold for any S and any p.
Keywords epistemic norm  doxastic ought  ought implies can
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