Why the argument from zombies against physicalism is question-begging
The Reasoner (forthcoming)
| Abstract | I argue that the argument from zombies against physicalism is question-begging unless proponents of the argument from zombies can justify the inference from the metaphysical possibility of zombies to the falsity of physicalism in an independent and non-circular way, i.e., a way that does not already assume the falsity of physicalism. | |||||||||
| Keywords | physicalism zombies | |||||||||
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