Why the argument from zombies against physicalism is question-begging

The Reasoner 7 (8):94-95 (2013)
Abstract
I argue that the argument from zombies against physicalism is question-begging unless proponents of the argument from zombies can justify the inference from the metaphysical possibility of zombies to the falsity of physicalism in an independent and non-circular way, i.e., a way that does not already assume the falsity of physicalism.
Keywords physicalism  zombies  Conceivability argument
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PhilPapers Archive Moti Mizrahi, Why the argument from zombies against physicalism is question-begging
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