Is colour composition phenomenal?

In D. Skusevich & P. Matikas (eds.), Color Perception: Physiology, Processes and Analysis. Nova Science Publishers (2009)
Most philosophical or scientific theories suppose that colour composition judgments refer to the way colours appear to us. The dominant view is therefore phenomenalist in the sense that colour composition is phenomenally given to perceivers. This paper argues that there is no evidence for a phenomenalist view of colour composition and that a conventionalist approach should be favoured.
Keywords Color  Composition  Binary  Unique  Hues
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Luke Roelofs (2014). Phenomenal Blending and the Palette Problem. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):59-70.

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