More Intuition Mongering

The Reasoner 7 (1):5-6 (2013)
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition are weak arguments because intellectual intuition is an unreliable belief-forming process, since it yields incompatible verdicts in response to the same cases, and since the inference from 'It seems to S that p' to 'p' is unreliable. Since the reliability of intellectual intuition is a necessary condition for strong appeals to intuition, it follows that appeals to intuition are weak arguments.
Keywords appeal to intuition  intellectual seeming  argument  belief
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Citations of this work BETA
Moti Mizrahi (2014). Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):183-197.
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Jennifer Mensch (2011). Intuition and Nature in Kant and Goethe. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):431-453.
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