Graduate studies at Western
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
|Abstract||In this paper, through a critical examination of Wray’s version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call “relative realism,” preserves the scientific realist’s optimism about science’s ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist’s premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons to think that science’s best theories are close to the truth.|
|Keywords||antirealism argument from underconsideration epistemic privilege relative realism scientific realism|
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