|Abstract||According to the argument from underconsideration, since theory evaluation is comparative, and since scientists do not have good reasons to believe that they are epistemically privileged, it is unlikely that our best theories are true. In this paper, I examine two formulations of this argument, one based on van Fraassen’s “bad lot” premise and another based on what Lipton called the “no-privilege” premise. I consider several moves that scientific realists might make in response to these arguments. I then offer a revised argument that is a middle ground between realism and anti-realism, or so I argue.|
|Keywords||anti-realism epistemic privilege scientific realism|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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