The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism

Abstract
In this article, through a critical examination of K. Brad Wray's version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call ‘relative realism’, preserves the scientific realist's optimism about science's ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist's premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons to think that science's best theories are close to the truth.
Keywords antirealism  argument from underconsideration  epistemic privilege  relative realism  scientific realism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Moti Mizrahi, The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Kareem Khalifa (2010). Default Privilege and Bad Lots: Underconsideration and Explanatory Inference. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):91 – 105.
K. Brad Wray (2008). The Argument From Underconsideration as Grounds for Anti-Realism: A Defence. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):317 – 326.
Moti Mizrahi (2012). Why the Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism Ultimately Fails. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):132-138.
Silvio Seno Chibeni (2005). Quinton's Neglected Argument for Scientific Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):393 - 400.
Sam Mitchell (1988). Constructive Empiricism and Anti-Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:174 - 180.
Mary Leng (2005). Platonism and Anti-Platonism: Why Worry? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):65 – 84.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-06-20

Total downloads

52 ( #29,468 of 1,096,760 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

17 ( #7,799 of 1,096,760 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.