David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal for General Philosophy of Science 45 (1):151-166 (2014)
Alexander Bird and Darrell Rowbottom have argued for two competing accounts of the concept of scientific progress. For Bird, progress consists in the accumulation of scientific knowledge. For Rowbottom, progress consists in the accumulation of true scientific beliefs. Both appeal to intuitions elicited by thought experiments in support of their views, and it seems fair to say that the debate has reached an impasse. In an attempt to avoid this stalemate, we conduct a systematic study of the factors that underlie judgments about scientific progress. Our results suggest that (internal) justification plays an important role in intuitive judgments about progress, questioning the intuitive support for the claim that the concept of scientific progress is best explained in terms of the accumulation of only true scientific belief
|Keywords||Concept of progress Aim of science Justification Scientific knowledge Scientific progress True belief|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Moti Mizrahi (2013). What is Scientific Progress? Lessons From Scientific Practice. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 44 (2):375-390.
Alexander Bird (2008). Scientific Progress as Accumulation of Knowledge: A Reply to Rowbottom. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):279-281.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). N-Rays and the Semantic View of Scientific Progress. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):277-278.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). What Scientific Progress Is Not: Against Bird's Epistemic View. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):241-255.
Alexander Bird (2007). What is Scientific Progress? Noûs 41 (1):64–89.
Gustavo Cevolani & Luca Tambolo (2013). Progress as Approximation to the Truth: A Defence of the Verisimilitudinarian Approach. Erkenntnis 78 (4):921-935.
Paul M. Quay (1974). Progress as a Demarcation Criterion for the Sciences. Philosophy of Science 41 (2):154-170.
Jonathan Y. Tsou (2006). Genetic Epistemology and Piaget's Philosophy of Science: Piaget Vs. Kuhn on Scientific Progress. Theory and Psychology 16 (2):203-224.
Alexander Bird (2010). The Epistemology of Science—a Bird's-Eye View. Synthese 175 (1):5 - 16.
James A. Marcum (2011). Horizon for Scientific Practice: Scientific Discovery and Progress. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):187-215.
Craig Dilworth (1994/1986). Scientific Progress: A Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories. Kluwer Academic.
Robert Almeder (1983). Scientific Progress and Peircean Utopian Realism. Erkenntnis 20 (3):253 - 280.
Patrick James (2004). Systemism, Social Mechanisms, and Scientific Progress: A Case Study of the International Crisis Behavior Project. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (3):352-370.
Leslie Sklair (1968). Gomte and the Idea of Progress. Inquiry 11 (1-4):321 – 331.
Added to index2012-04-03
Total downloads96 ( #12,411 of 1,102,807 )
Recent downloads (6 months)31 ( #3,522 of 1,102,807 )
How can I increase my downloads?