Why the ultimate argument for scientific realism ultimately fails

In this paper, I argue that the ultimate argument for Scientific Realism, also known as the No-Miracles Argument (NMA), ultimately fails as an abductive defence of Epistemic Scientific Realism (ESR), where (ESR) is the thesis that successful theories of mature sciences are approximately true. The NMA is supposed to be an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) that purports to explain the success of science. However, the explanation offered as the best explanation for success, namely (ESR), fails to yield independently testable predictions that alternative explanations for success do not yield. If this is correct, then there seems to be no good reason to prefer (ESR) over alternative explanations for success.
Keywords scientific realism  anti-realism  no-miracles argument  inference to the best explanation
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.11.001
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References found in this work BETA
Philip Kitcher (1981). Explanatory Unification. Philosophy of Science 48 (4):507-531.
Elie Zahar (1973). Why Did Einstein's Programme Supersede Lorentz's? (I). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):95-123.

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Citations of this work BETA
Moti Mizrahi (2013). The Argument From Underconsideration and Relative Realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):393-407.

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