David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theoria 76 (3):249-265 (2010)
This article discusses the argument we cannot have knowledge of abstract entities because they are not part of the causal order. The claim of this article is that the argument fails because of equivocation. Assume that the “causal order” is concerned with contingent facts involving time and space. Even if the existence of abstract entities is not contingent and does not involve time or space it does not follow that no truths about abstract entities are contingent or involve time or space. I argue that it is the latter which is required to obtain the desired conclusion
|Keywords||Platonism abstract entities|
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References found in this work BETA
David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
Theodore Sider (2001). Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.
Scott Soames (2002). Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. Oxford University Press.
Hartry Field (1989). Realism, Mathematics & Modality. Basil Blackwell.
David Lewis (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
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