Theoria 76 (3):249-265 (2010)
|Abstract||This article discusses the argument we cannot have knowledge of abstract entities because they are not part of the causal order. The claim of this article is that the argument fails because of equivocation. Assume that the “causal order” is concerned with contingent facts involving time and space. Even if the existence of abstract entities is not contingent and does not involve time or space it does not follow that no truths about abstract entities are contingent or involve time or space. I argue that it is the latter which is required to obtain the desired conclusion|
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