David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Economics and Philosophy 18 (2):235-257 (2002)
In a series of insightful publications, Philip Pettit and Frank Jackson have argued for an explanatory ecumenism that is designed to justify a variety of types of social scientific explanation of different , including structural and rational choice explanations. Their arguments are put in terms of different kinds of explanatory information; the distinction between causal efficacy, causal relevance and explanatory relevance within their program model of explanation; and virtual reality and resilience explanation. The arguments are here assessed from the point of view of the illumination they are able to cast on the issue of economics imperialism, the project of privileging rational choice as a unifying basis for explanations. While the Jackson–Pettit arguments turn out to be helpful in specifying some of the ontological and pragmatic constraints on economics imperialism, they are also shown to conflate distinct dimensions in the purported explanantia (such as small grain and particular grain, and the macro and the existentially quantified) and thereby to miss an important class of individualist causal process explanations of social phenomena
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Uskali Mäki (2014). Scientific Imperialism: Difficulties in Definition, Identification, and Assessment. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (3):325-339.
Aki Lehtinen & Jaakko Kuorikoski (2007). Computing the Perfect Model: Why Do Economists Shun Simulation? Philosophy of Science 74 (3):304-329.
Similar books and articles
Jeroen van Bouwel, Erik Weber & Leen de Vreese (2011). Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):33-46.
Elizabeth Valentine (1988). Teleological Explanations and Their Relation to Causal Explanation in Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):61-68.
Denis J. Hilton (1996). Mental Models and Causal Explanation: Judgements of Probable Cause and Explanatory Relevance. Thinking and Reasoning 2 (4):273 – 308.
Milan Zafirovski (2000). The Rational Choice Generalization of Neoclassical Economics Reconsidered: Any Theoretical Legitimation for Economic Imperialism? Sociological Theory 18 (3):448-471.
Caterina Marchionni (2008). Explanatory Pluralism and Complementarity: From Autonomy to Integration. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (3):314-333.
Brad Weslake (2010). Explanatory Depth. Philosophy of Science 77 (2):273-294.
By Nic Damnjanovic (2005). Deflationism and the Success Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):53–67.
J. Kuorikoski & A. Lehtinen (2010). Economics Imperialism and Solution Concepts in Political Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (3):347-374.
Cindy Stern (1978). On the Alleged Extensionality of "Causal Explanatory Contexts". Philosophy of Science 45 (4):614-625.
Erik Weber & Jeroen Van Bouwel (2002). Symposium on Explanations and Social Ontology 3: Can We Dispense with Structural Explanations of Social Facts? Economics and Philosophy 18 (2):259-275.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads29 ( #136,893 of 1,907,520 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #464,819 of 1,907,520 )
How can I increase my downloads?