Studia Philosophica Estonica 1:179-193 (2008)
|Abstract||It has been argued that deflationary theories of truth stumble over the normativity of truth. This paper maintains that the normativity objection does not pose problems to at least one version of deflationism, minimalism. The rest of the paper discusses truth-related norms, showing that either they do not hold or they are not troublesome for deflationism.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Cezary Cieśliński (2010). Truth, Conservativeness, and Provability. Mind 119 (474):409-422.
Kyle Swan (2002). Emotivism and Deflationary Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):270–281.
B. Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (2005). Deflationary Truth. Open Court Press.
Matthew McGrath (2003). Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth. Philosophical Studies 112 (1):47 - 67.
Timothy Bays (2009). Beth's Theorem and Deflationism. Mind 118 (472):1061-1073.
James R. Beebe (2006). Reliabilism and Deflationism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):495 – 510.
James O. Young (2009). Truth, Correspondence and Deflationism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):563-575.
Jerry Kapus (2007). Truth, Deflationism, and Success. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:85-91.
Glen Hoffmann (2010). The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.
Added to index2009-11-23
Total downloads17 ( #71,134 of 549,128 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,390 of 549,128 )
How can I increase my downloads?