Consciousness without Physical Basis. A Metaphysical Meditation on the Immortality of the Soul
| Abstract | Can we conceive of a mind without body? Does, for example, the idea of the soul's immortality make sense? Certain versions of materialism deny such questions; I shall try to prove that these versions of materialism cannot be right. They fail because they cannot account for the mental vocabulary from the language of brains in the vat. Envatted expressions such as "I think", "I believe", etc., do not have to be reinterpreted when we translate them to our language; they are semantically stable. By contrast, physical expressions from the vat language are semantically instable; due to Putnam's externalism they cannot be transported to our language without change. This contrast opens the way to a new understanding of what the immortality of the soul might be like: A brain in a vat (and its mental life) might survive what the brain calls "my physical body's death". | |||||||||
| Keywords | Soul Immortality Materialism Matrix Brain in a Vat Externalism Philosophy of Mind Semantic Stability Metaphysics Hilary PUTNAM | |||||||||
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