David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Minds and Machines 17 (1):101-115 (2007)
This paper investigates the prospects of Rodney Brooks’ proposal for AI without representation. It turns out that the supposedly characteristic features of “new AI” (embodiment, situatedness, absence of reasoning, and absence of representation) are all present in conventional systems: “New AI” is just like old AI. Brooks proposal boils down to the architectural rejection of central control in intelligent agents—Which, however, turns out to be crucial. Some of more recent cognitive science suggests that we might do well to dispose of the image of intelligent agents as central representation processors. If this paradigm shift is achieved, Brooks’ proposal for cognition without representation appears promising for full-blown intelligent agents—Though not for conscious agents.
|Keywords||artificial intelligence Brooks representation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Vincent C. Müller (2009). Symbol Grounding in Computational Systems: A Paradox of Intentions. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 19 (4):529-541.
Similar books and articles
Hengwei Li & Huaxin Huang (2007). Representation and Development of Cognition. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):583-600.
Winfried Nöth (2011). From Representation to Thirdness and Representamen to Medium: Evolution of Peircean Key Terms and Topics. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (4):445-481.
Brendan Kitts (1999). Representation Operators and Computation. Minds and Machines 9 (2):223-240.
Mark H. Bickhard (2000). Information and Representation in Autonomous Agents. Cognitive Systems Research 1 (2):65-75.
Mark H. Bickhard (1993). Representational Content in Humans and Machines. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 5:285-33.
Luc Steels & Rodney Brooks (eds.) (1995). The "Artificial Life" Route to "Artificial Intelligence": Building Situated Embodied Agents. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
William S. Robinson (1999). Representation and Cognitive Explanation. In Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences: Does Representation Need Reality, Riegler. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.
D. H. M. Brooks (1992). Secondary Qualities and Representation. Analysis 52 (3):174-179.
Rodney Brooks (1991). Intelligence Without Representation. Artificial Intelligence 47:139-159.
Peter Wallis (2004). Intention Without Representation. Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):209-223.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads71 ( #16,365 of 1,088,810 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,810 )
How can I increase my downloads?