Weak evidence for a strong case against modularity in developmental disorders

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):764-765 (2002)
Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith (T&K-S) provide evidence from computational modeling against modular assumptions of “Residual Normality” (RN) in developmental disorders. Even though I agree with their criticism, I find their choice of empirical evidence disappointing. Cognitive neuroscience cannot as yet provide a complete understanding of most developmental disorders, but what is known is more than enough to debunk the idea of RN.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X02360138
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J. Briscoe (2002). The Beauty of Models for Developmental Disorders. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):750-752.

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