Are there rival, incommensurable theories?

Philosophy of Science 46 (2):244-262 (1979)
Following an account of the incommensurability argument, an objection, based on assumptions concerning rival theories, is examined and rejected. This rejection leads to an alternative direction of criticism of incommensurability, a direction that involves the articulation of comparative standards of theory evaluation that are independent of meaning invariance
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DOI 10.1086/288864
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Daniel Goldman Cedarbaum (1983). Paradigms. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 14 (3):173-213.

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