A paradox of ideal rational inquiry
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Rex Martin (2005). Marcus G. Singer, The Ideal of a Rational Morality: Philosophical Compositions:The Ideal of a Rational Morality: Philosophical Compositions. Ethics 115 (4):845-850.
J. Anthony Blair (2012). Argumentation as Rational Persuasion. Argumentation 26 (1):71-81.
William Hare (2004). Open-Minded Inquiry. Inquiry 23 (3):37-41.
Armando Cíntora (2006). Are Impossible Goals Rational? The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:113-119.
Igor Douven (2003). The Preface Paradox Revisited. Erkenntnis 59 (3):389 - 420.
I. Douven (2012). The Sequential Lottery Paradox. Analysis 72 (1):55-57.
Reed Richter (1990). Ideal Rationality and Hand Waving. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):147 – 156.
William Berkson (1979). Skeptical Rationalism. Inquiry 22 (1-4):281 – 320.
Thomas Kroedel (2012). The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility. Analysis 72 (1):57-60.
Marc Moffett (2007). ``Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry&Quot. Episteme 4 (3):352-367.
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