Philosophical Studies 115 (1):81-97 (2003)
|Abstract||The Problem of Doxastic Shift may be stated as a dilemma: on the one hand, the distribution of nominal complements of the form `the that p strongly suggests that `that-clauses cannot be univocally assigned propositionaldenotations; on the other hand, facts about quantification strongly suggest that `that-clauses must be assigned univocal denotations. I argue that the Problem may be solved by defining the extension of a proposition to be a set of facts or, more generally, conditions. Given this, the logical operation of descriptive predication can be introduced in a way that resolves the dilemma withoutsacrificing the singular term analysis of `that-clauses|
|Keywords||Belief Fact Knowledge Logic Proposition Quantification|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jonathan Sutton, How to Mistake a Trivial Fact About Probability for a Substantive Fact About Justified Belief.
Jason Stanley (2011). Know How. Oxford University Press.
Mark Textor (2011). Knowing the Facts. Dialectica 65 (1):75-86.
Philip L. Peterson (2000). Fact-, Proposition-, and Event-Individuation. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:29-36.
Christian Piller (2009). Reliabilist Responses to the Value of Knowledge Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):121-135.
James Pryor (2007). Reasons and That‐Clauses. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):217-244.
Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe (1996). The Doctrine of Descent in Jerónimo Pardo: Meaning, Inference, Truth. In I. Angelelli & M. Cerezo (eds.), Studies on the History of Logic. Walter de Gruyter.
Juan Comesaña (2005). We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59–76.
Tobias Rosefeldt (2008). 'That'-Clauses and Non-Nominal Quantification. Philosophical Studies 137 (3):301 - 333.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads25 ( #55,649 of 722,813 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,813 )
How can I increase my downloads?