Attitudinal Objects and the Distinction between Actions and Products
| Abstract | In this paper, I will explore a notion of a truth-bearing entity that is distinct both from a proposition and from an intentional event, state, or action, and that is the notion of an attitudinal object. Attitudinal objects are entities like ‘John’s belief that S’, John’s claim that S’, ‘John’s desire that S’, or ‘John’s request that S’. The notion of an attitudinal object has an important precedent in the work of the Polish philosopher Twardowski (1912), who drew a more general distinction between ‘actions’ and ‘products’, such as walking, screaming, judging, and thinking on the one hand and a walk, a scream, a judgment, and a thought on the other hand. While Twardowski left the distinction at an intuitive level, I will propose an ontological account of the distinction, based on the notion of a trope or particularized property. | |||||||||
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