David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In some recent developments of semantic theory, in particular certain versions of dynamic semantics, ‘internal’ contexts, that is, contexts defined in terms of the interlocutors’ pragmatic presuppositions or the information accumulated in the discourse have come to play a central role, replacing the notion of propositional content in favor of a notion of context change potential as the meaning of sentences. I will argue that there are a number of fundamental problems with this conception of sentence meaning and outline a way of dealing with the ‘dynamic phenomena’ from the perspective of the traditional distinctions between propositional content and (internal) context as well between propositional content and illocutionary force, using structured propositions and minimal discourse-driven internal context.
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