Generalizing Detached Self-Reference and the Semantics of Generic 'One'

Mind and Language 25 (4):440-473 (2010)
In this paper I will give an analysis of what I call ‘generalizing detached self-reference’ within a general account of reference to the first person. With generalizing detached self-reference an agent attributes properties to a range of individuals by putting himself into their shoes, or simulating them. I will show that generalizing detached self-reference plays an important role in the semantics of natural language, in particular in the English generic one and in what syntacticians call arbitrary PRO
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01397.x
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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Citations of this work BETA
Wolfgang Barz (2015). Transparent Introspection of Wishes. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):1993-2023.
John Collins (2013). The Syntax of Personal Taste. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):51-103.

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