David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (5):445-481 (2003)
Quantified expressions in natural language generally are taken to act like quantifiers in logic, which either range over entities that need to satisfy or not satisfy the predicate in order for the sentence to be true or otherwise are substitutional quantifiers. I will argue that there is a philosophically rather important class of quantified expressions in English that act quite differently, a class that includes something, nothing, and several things. In addition to expressing quantification, such expressions act like nominalizations, introducing a new domain of objects that would not have been present in the semantic structure of the sentence otherwise. The entities those expressions introduce are of just the same sort as those that certain ordinary nominalizations refer to (such as John's wisdom or John's belief that S), namely they are tropes or entities related to tropes. Analysing certain quantifiers as nominalizing quantifiers will shed a new light on philosophical issues such as the status of properties and the nature of propositional attitudes
|Keywords||nominalism nominalizations ontology properties propositional attitudes quantification quantifiers in natural language tropes|
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Alvin I. Goldman (1970). A Theory of Human Action. Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Peter Hanks (2009). Recent Work on Propositions. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):469-486.
Friederike Moltmann (2010). Relative Truth and the First Person. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):187-220..
Friederike Moltmann (2013). Reference to Numbers in Natural Language. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):499 - 536.
Friederike Moltmann (2008). Intensional Verbs and Their Intentional Objects. Natural Language Semantics 16 (3):239-270.
Friederike Moltmann (2012). Two Kinds of First-Person-Oriented Content. Synthese 184 (2):157 - 177.
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