Synthese 135 (1):77 - 118 (2003)
|Abstract||The most common account of attitude reports is the relational analysis according towhich an attitude verb taking that-clause complements expresses a two-placerelation between agents and propositions and the that-clause acts as an expressionwhose function is to provide the propositional argument. I will argue that a closerexamination of a broader range of linguistic facts raises serious problems for thisanalysis and instead favours a Russellian `multiple relations analysis' (which hasgenerally been discarded because of its apparent obvious linguistic implausibility).The resulting account can be given independent philosophical motivations within anintentionalist view of truth and predication.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
John Zeimbekis (2004). Propositional Attitudes in Fiction. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):261-276.
David J. Chalmers (2011). Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account. Noûs 45 (4):595-639.
P. Weatherall (1996). What Do Propositions Measure in Folk Psychology? Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):365-80.
Mark E. Richard (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Stephen Schiffer (2007). Propositions, What Are They Good For? In R. Schantz (ed.), Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy: Prospects for Meaning Vol. 3. Walter de Gruyter.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads71 ( #11,988 of 549,198 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #7,855 of 549,198 )
How can I increase my downloads?