Propositional attitudes without propositions

Synthese 135 (1):77 - 118 (2003)
The most common account of attitude reports is the relational analysis according towhich an attitude verb taking that-clause complements expresses a two-placerelation between agents and propositions and the that-clause acts as an expressionwhose function is to provide the propositional argument. I will argue that a closerexamination of a broader range of linguistic facts raises serious problems for thisanalysis and instead favours a Russellian `multiple relations analysis' (which hasgenerally been discarded because of its apparent obvious linguistic implausibility).The resulting account can be given independent philosophical motivations within anintentionalist view of truth and predication.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.2307/20117355
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Peter Hanks (2009). Recent Work on Propositions. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):469-486.
Trenton Merricks (2009). Propositional Attitudes? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):207 - 232.

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