David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 150 (2):187-220. (2010)
In recent work on contextdependency, it has been argued that certain types of sentences give rise to a notion of relative truth. In particular, sentences containing predicates of personal taste and moral or aesthetic evaluation as well as epistemic modals are held to express a proposition (relative to a context of use) which is true or false not only relative to a world of evaluation, but other parameters as well, such as standards of taste or knowledge or an agent. Thus, a sentence like chocolate tastes good would express a proposition p that is true or false not only at a world of evaluation, but relative to the additional parameter as well, such as a parameter of taste or an agent. I will argue that the sentences that apparently give rise to relative truth should be understood by relating them in a certain way to the first person. More precisely, such sentences express what I will call firstpersonbased genericity, a form of generalization that is based on or directed toward an essential firstperson application of the predicate. The account differs from standard relative truth account in crucial respects: it is not the truth of the proposition expressed that is relative to the first person; the proposition expressed by a sentence with a predicate of taste rather has absolute truth conditions. Instead it is the propositional content itself that requires a firstpersonal cognitive access whenever it is entertained. This account, I will argue, avoids a range of problems that standard relative truth theories of the sentences in question face and explains a number of further peculiarities that such sentences display
|Keywords||relative truth first person generic 'one' predicates of taste|
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Citations of this work BETA
Filip Buekens (2011). Faultless Disagreement, Assertions and the Affective-Expressive Dimension of Judgments of Taste. Philosophia 39 (4):637-655.
Kjell Johan Sæbø (2009). Judgment Ascriptions. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (4):327-352.
Max Kölbel (2013). The Conversational Role of Centered Contents. Inquiry 56 (2-3):97-121.
Chris Barker (2013). Negotiating Taste. Inquiry 56 (2-3):240-257.
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