Relative Truth and the First Person

Philosophical Studies 150 (2):187-220. (2010)
In recent work on context­dependency, it has been argued that certain types of sentences give rise to a notion of relative truth. In particular, sentences containing predicates of personal taste and moral or aesthetic evaluation as well as epistemic modals are held to express a proposition (relative to a context of use) which is true or false not only relative to a world of evaluation, but other parameters as well, such as standards of taste or knowledge or an agent. Thus, a sentence like chocolate tastes good would express a proposition p that is true or false not only at a world of evaluation, but relative to the additional parameter as well, such as a parameter of taste or an agent. I will argue that the sentences that apparently give rise to relative truth should be understood by relating them in a certain way to the first person. More precisely, such sentences express what I will call first­person­based genericity, a form of generalization that is based on or directed toward an essential first­person application of the predicate. The account differs from standard relative truth account in crucial respects: it is not the truth of the proposition expressed that is relative to the first person; the proposition expressed by a sentence with a predicate of taste rather has absolute truth conditions. Instead it is the propositional content itself that requires a first­personal cognitive access whenever it is entertained. This account, I will argue, avoids a range of problems that standard relative truth theories of the sentences in question face and explains a number of further peculiarities that such sentences display
Keywords relative truth  first person  generic 'one'  predicates of taste
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9383-9
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References found in this work BETA
John MacFarlane (2007). Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
A. Goldman (1989). Interpretation Psychologized. Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.

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Citations of this work BETA
Chris Barker (2013). Negotiating Taste. Inquiry 56 (2-3):240-257.
Diana Raffman (2016). Relativism, Retraction, and Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):171-178.

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