David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 66 (291):240–247 (2006)
Many philosophers believe that just as moral reasons do not diminish in force across space, so they do not diminish across time, and that we should accordingly be neutral between the interests of present people and future people. This allows them to make the plausible claim that we should not discount the interests of future generations when making decisions about things like consuming scarce resources.1 However, when this outlook is combined with a small number of fairly weak assumptions, it becomes difficult to resist answering the title-question in the affirmative.2 By analogy, it also becomes hard to deny that we should delay aid intended to prevent suffering short of death as well. Although I will be arguing that we should take this view seriously, my goal is to explain it, not to vindicate it.
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Peter Singer (1993). Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Henry Sidgwick (1907). The Methods of Ethics. Thoemmes Press.
Roger Crisp (2003). Equality, Priority, and Compassion. Ethics 113 (4):745-763.
Harry Frankfurt (1987). Equality as a Moral Ideal. Ethics 98 (1):21-43.
Citations of this work BETA
Tomasz Żuradzki (2016). Time-Biases and Rationality: The Philosophical Perspectives on Empirical Research About Time Preferences. In Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz Brożek & Łukasz Kurek (eds.), The Emergence of Normative Orders. Copernicus Press 149-187.
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