Tropes, Bare Demonstratives, and Apparent Statements of Identity

Noûs 47 (2):346-370 (2013)
Abstract
Philosophers who accept tropes generally agree that tropes act as the objects of reference of nominalizations of adjectives, such as 'Socrates’ wisdom' or 'the beauty of the landscape'. This paper argues that tropes play a further important role in the semantics of natural language, namely in the semantics of bare demonstratives like 'this' and 'that' in what in linguistics is called identificational sentences.
Keywords tropes  relative identity  demonstratives
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References found in this work BETA
Harry Deutsch, Relative Identity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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