Why experience told me nothing about transparency

Noûs 43 (1):116-136 (2009)
Abstract
The transparency argument concludes that we're directly aware of external properties and not directly aware of the properties of experience. Focusing on the presentation used by Michael Tye (2002) I contend that the argument requires experience to have content that it cannot plausibly have. I attribute the failure to a faulty account of the transparency phenomenon and conclude by suggesting an alternative understanding that is independently plausible, is not an error-theory and yet renders the transparency of experience compatible with mental-paint style views.
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel Dennett (1994). Get Real. [Journal (Paginated)] (Unpublished) 22 (1-2):505-568.
Daniel C. Dennett (1995). Get Real. Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):505-568.
Amy Kind (2003). What's so Transparent About Transparency? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.

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