An independent, empirical route to nonconceptual content

Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):439-448 (2009)
The overall goal of this paper is to offer an independent, empirical route to characterize the content on nonconceptual content. I pursue a recent move by Pylyshyn, a leading cognitive scientist and philosopher of mental representation, who focuses on empirical considerations in favor of nonconceptual representations. Pylyshyn proposes a minimalist view of nonconceptual representations. I offer empirical reasons that force us to go beyond minimalist account and reinstate empirically defensible richer nonconceptual representations into a theory of content
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2009.02.008
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,904
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Richard Heck (2007). Are There Different Kinds of Content? In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell 117–38.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Michael Tye (2005). On the Nonconceptual Content of Experience. Schriftenreihe-Wittgenstein Gesellschaft.
York H. Gunther (2001). Content, Illusion, Partition. Philosophical Studies 102 (2):185-202.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

20 ( #139,825 of 1,725,558 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #211,098 of 1,725,558 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.